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Wynnefield Capital, Inc. founder Nelson Obus.1 Finding that the
SEC provided sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material
fact as to whether Obus and the other defendants engaged in
conduct amounting to insider trading in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 and Rule 10b-53 promulgated thereunder, the
Second Circuit vacated the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.4 However, the significance of
the Second Circuit’s decision is not limited to its revival of the SEC’s
complaint. Perhaps more importantly, the opinion offered a longawaited resolution to the question of the degree of knowledge a
tippee5 must have in order to satisfy insider trading’s scienter
element.6 The Second Circuit opined that sufficient scienter exists
when the “tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential
information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly” and
“the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while in knowing
possession of that information.”7
This Note argues that by adopting both a negligence and actual
knowledge standard in SEC v. Obus,8 the Second Circuit failed to
provide a practical resolution to the apparent tippee scienter conflict.
Part I provides a brief overview of the seminal Supreme Court cases
that define the ambits of insider trading regulation and outlines the
theoretical inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s approach to tippee
scienter. Part II sets forth the facts and procedural history of Obus
and provides the details of the Second Circuit’s decision. Part III
contends that by adopting the conflicting language without offering a
workable application mechanism, the Second Circuit merely
1. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78ee (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
4. Obus, 693 F.3d at 279.
5. A “tippee” is an individual who trades in securities on the basis of nonpublic
information obtained from a corporate insider or misappropriator. The types of
individuals considered to be “insiders” include officers, directors, and majority and
controlling shareholders. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). In
this Note, the term “misappropriator” is used to describe an individual, such as an
independent certified public accountant or outside legal counsel, who
misappropriates confidential corporate information to which he or she had
legitimate access. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997); see also infra
text accompanying notes 25–26.
6. Obus, 693 F.3d at 287–88. Scienter is the “degree of knowledge that makes a
person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009). The Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), adopted scienter as an element of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 liability.
7. Obus, 693 F.3d at 288.
8. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
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solidified the incongruity surrounding tippee scienter rather than
providing for a remedy. Part III further argues that the Second
Circuit undermined the connection between insider trading and
fraud by adopting a negligence standard.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Liability for Insider Trading: An Overview of the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Prohibition of insider trading—the “unlawful trading in securities
based on material non-public information”9—is well vested in the
American legal system.10 However, the statutory footing on which the
prohibition stands—section 10(b) of the Exchange Act with
companion Rule 10b-5—is notably devoid of any express
proscription.11 Instead, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 state merely
that it is unlawful for individuals to perpetrate a fraud or deceit upon
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.12
9. Id. at 284.
10. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907 (noting that the need for securities
regulation is so well known and the prevention of fraud so understood to be a major
purpose of that regulation that “citation is unnecessary”); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 936 (5th ed., 2004)
(commenting on how the extensive development of Rule 10b-5 reflects a unique
conflation of legislative, administrative, and judicial law); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse
Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1293 (1998) (observing the ongoing position insider
trading has held on the pens of federal judges and legal commentators); William R.
McLucas et al., Settlement of Insider Trading Cases with the SEC, 48 BUS. LAW. 79, 85
(1992) (describing the continual importance of insider trading as one of the SEC’s
primary areas of enforcement).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any . . . deceptive
device . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate . . . .”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (“It shall
be unlawful . . . [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”); cf. Carol B. Swanson,
Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates the Misappropriation
Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1166–68 (1997) (discussing Congress’s
unsuccessful attempt to provide a legislative definition for insider trading).
Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 delineate certain conduct as unlawful,
neither provide for a private right of action to individuals injured by a violation
thereof. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164
(2008). However, beginning in 1946 with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), courts have consistently recognized a private right of action for
10b-5 violations. Anne T. Foley, Note, The Clarification of Tippee Liability Under Rule
10b-5: Dirks v. SEC, 25 B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1060 n.7 (1984) (citing RICHARD W.
JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 808
(5th ed., 1982)). Conversely, criminal liability for Rule 10b-5 violations is provided
for in section 32(a) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
12. John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need
To Codify the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 985, 986–87 (1988).
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Thus, in the absence of more specific direction from Congress or the
SEC, courts have been left to define the contours of the law against
insider trading.13
Generally, the Supreme Court has interpreted “deceptive device”14
in section 10(b) to include the use of inside information, i.e.,
material nonpublic information about an issuing company or the
market, in connection with the buying and selling of securities.15
However, the Court has stopped short of classifying all securities
trading on the basis of inside information as a form of deception
contemplated by the Act and accompanying Rule.16 Instead, the
Court has built its insider trading jurisprudence on the notion that
only certain individuals have a duty to either disclose inside
information or abstain from trading on it.17 In Chiarella v. United
States,18 the Supreme Court articulated that the duty to disclose or
abstain arises from the existence of a fiduciary relationship between a
corporate insider and the corporation’s shareholders.19 The Chiarella
Court explained that it is this duty that implicates section 10(b) and
13. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (“When
we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”); Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities
Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 545 (2011) (“The law of securities fraud is one of the most
heavily judicially created bodies of federal law.”); Dalley, supra note 10, at 1294
(“[F]ederal courts have been left to determine what exactly is common law fraud in
the securities context.”). Eventually, the SEC formally acknowledged insider trading
as conduct prohibited by section 10(b), after years of uncertainty among courts,
legislators, and legal and business commentators as to the scope of insider trading
regulation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2000). For a discussion of the impetus and
reaction to Rule 10b5-1, see generally Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness:
Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 190–96 (2003).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
15. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
16. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983).
17. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–27 (1980).
18. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella involved an employee of a financial printer
who was convicted of securities trading in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 224–25. By deciphering coded takeover bid announcements that were to be
printed by his employer company, Chiarella learned the identity of certain
corporations targeted for acquisition. Id. at 224. Before the potential acquisitions
were announced, Chiarella purchased stock in the targeted companies. Id. He then
sold the stock when the bids were made public. Id. Chiarella was indicted and
subsequently convicted in district court on seventeen counts of violating 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Id. at 225. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, which were
ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court. Id.
19. Id. at 227. Under this theory, Chiarella’s conviction was reversed by the
Court because he did not have a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and
confidence with the targeted companies, and therefore, he did not have a duty to
disclose or abstain from trading. Id. at 233–35. The Chiarella decision foreclosed on
a dueling theory of liability that anyone who had access to material nonpublic
information had the duty to disclose or abstain. See id. at 231–33 (refusing to
recognize “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information”).
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Rule 10b-5’s antifraud provisions, because consistent with
misrepresentation in the common law, “one who fails to disclose
material information . . . commits fraud only when he is under the
duty to do so.”20
The Court confers the duty to disclose or abstain on the basis of
one of two theories: the classical theory or the misappropriation
theory. Under the classical theory, corporate insiders are precluded
from using material nonpublic information to trade in the securities
of that corporation.21 The classical theory is premised on the trust
and confidence owed to a corporation’s current and future
shareholders by corporate insiders who acquire confidential
information as a result of their position.22 The shareholder is entitled
to the inside information known by the insider as a consequence of
the trust-evoking nature of their relationship.23
Under the misappropriation theory, sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in United States v. O’Hagan,24 it is not the corporate insider who
has a duty to disclose or abstain, but rather the corporate outsider
who has been entrusted with confidential information and who owes
a duty to the source of that information not to use it for his or her
personal benefit.25 The misappropriation theory is premised on the
notion that “[a] fiduciary who [pretends] loyalty to the principal
while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal
gain, dupes or defrauds the principal.”26
Under both the classical and misappropriation theories, liability for
insider trading is not strictly limited to those insiders and
misappropriators who personally trade on the inside information.27
The Court feared that such a limitation would result in fiduciaries
doing indirectly that which they could not do directly.28 Thus, the
Court has interpreted section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s proscriptions to
also include situations in which the insider or misappropriator relates

20. Id. at 228. But see id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that common
law support for the majority’s position is tenuous at best); Alison Grey Anderson,
Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 360–66 (1982)
(criticizing the Chiarella Court’s application of the misrepresentation doctrine to the
insider trading context).
21. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 228.
24. 521 U.S 642 (1997).
25. Id. at 652.
26. Id. at 653–54 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 167 (3d ed. 2010).
28. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
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inside information to another individual who uses the information to
trade.29
B. Tippee Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Scienter
Element and the Apparent Conflict Between Dirks v. SEC and Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder
In Dirks v. SEC,30 the Court held that liability for insider trading
extends to instances where an insider or misappropriator tips
material nonpublic information to a third party who then trades on
the basis of that tip.31 Under Dirks, a tippee inherits the tipper’s duty
to disclose or abstain when the tipper has breached his or her
fiduciary duty by relating inside information to the tippee32 and the
tippee “knows or should know that there has been a breach.”33 It is the
Court’s use of “should know,” language typically denoting a
negligence standard,34 which is the source of considerable confusion
surrounding tippee liability, as seven years prior to its decision in
Dirks, the Court had expressly ruled that negligent conduct would not
give rise to section 10(b) liability.35
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,36 the Court concluded that the plain
language of section 10(b) “so clearly connotes intentional
29. Id. at 654–64 (accepting tippee liability for insider trading).
30. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The Dirks Court reviewed the conviction of Raymond
Dirks, a securities analyst who received material nonpublic information from insiders
of a corporation with which he otherwise had no connection. Id. at 648. Dirks
relayed this information to investors who used the information to trade in the
corporation’s shares. Id.
31. See id. at 659–60 (recognizing that “[n]ot only are insiders forbidden by their
fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate information to
their advantage, but they also may not give such information to an outsider for the
same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain”).
Although the Dirks decision only addressed tipper/tippee liability under the classical
theory of insider trading, circuit courts have adopted Dirks in the misappropriation
context. See, e.g., SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012); SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d
1085 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007); SEC v.
Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). But see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 27, at
207–08, 388–89, 476–82 (discussing the practical and theoretical difficulties
associated with establishing tipper/tippee liability under the misappropriation
theory).
32. The test for whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the
information is determined by whether he or she derives “benefit, directly or
indirectly, from [the] disclosure.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
33. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. g (2010) (stating that to establish an actor’s negligence, the likelihood
of harm must have been foreseeable, as determined by “what the actor ‘should have
known’”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 cmt. a (1965) (stating that
negligent conduct is the performance of an act that the actor “knows or should
know[] would realize the existence of the risk and its unreasonable character”).
35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
36. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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misconduct” that a private action could not survive merely on a
showing of negligence.37 The Court observed that nothing in section
10(b)’s legislative history indicated that Congress intended to
proscribe conduct without scienter.38 While the Hochfelder Court
generally defined “scienter” as the “mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”39 the Court failed to provide a
precise measure of the degree of knowledge that would satisfy the
scienter requirement.40 Instead, the Court made clear what would
not: negligence.41
Therefore, the Court’s adoption of negligence-type rhetoric in the
Dirks opinion has generated a great deal of uncertainty as to the
degree of knowledge required for tippee liability under section
10(b).42 Notably, the Dirks opinion does not reject or attempt to
distinguish the scienter requisite from the Hochfelder Court; in fact,
the Dirks opinion reaffirms that scienter is a requirement for section
10(b) liability.43 Even with the Dirks Court’s clear acceptance of
scienter as an element of insider trading, legal authorities are
hesitant to dismiss the opinion’s use of “should know” as simply

37. Id. at 200–01. Although the Hochfelder Court only addressed the question of
whether intent was required in section 10(b) private civil actions, the Court in Aaron
v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), extended the requirement to administrative actions
brought by the SEC. Id. at 701–02.
38. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 202.
39. Id. at 194 n.12.
40. See Buell, supra note 13, at 534 (explaining that the statement, “scienter is
required for liability,” in practice does no more than rule out strict liability, and
therefore, a range of cognizance levels may be encompassed by the word). The
Hochfelder Court specifically reserved the question of whether recklessness satisfies
the scienter requirement, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12, and the Court has yet to rule on the
matter, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1322 (2011). Among
the circuit courts, recklessness has widely been adopted as a sufficiently culpable
mental state. See, e.g., SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286 (2d Cir. 2012); SEC v.
Shanahan, 646 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir. 2011); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp.,
617 F.3d 1072, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Lyttle, 538 F.3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2008);
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985); Hackbart v. Holmes,
675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982).
41. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214–15 & n.33.
42. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 27, at 403 & n.487 (outlining the
contrasting approaches commentators have offered to reconcile the Dirks Court’s
“knows or should know” test and the scienter requirement); William H. Kuehnle, On
Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under Federal Securities Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121,
122 (1997) (“The state of mind required to commit fraud under Section 10(b) . . .
has long been a subject of uncertainty.”). But see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 27,
at 168 (maintaining that the requirement that the tippee knows or should know is
distinct from the scienter element).
43. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) (“[A] violation may be found
only where there is ‘intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors . . . .’” (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199)).
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careless word choice,44 and the Court has propagated this stance by
continuing to quote the Dirks opinion’s “should know” language in its
insider trading jurisprudence.45 When the Second Circuit issued its
Obus opinion in September 2012, almost thirty years after the Dirks
decision, the implication of the Court’s use of “should know” was still
unanswered.46
II. SEC V. OBUS
A. Facts and Procedural History
In the spring of 2001, Allied Capital Corporation approached
General Electric Capital Corporation (GE) about financing for
Allied’s prospective acquisition of SunSource, Inc.47 As assistant
vice president and underwriter for GE, Thomas Strickland learned
about the potential acquisition when he was assigned by his
employer to perform due diligence for the deal. 48 Strickland then
learned that Wynnefield Capital was a large shareholder in
SunSource.49 The SEC alleged that it was at this point when
Strickland contacted his old college friend and Wynnefield Capital
employee, Peter Black, and tipped him to the pending
acquisition.50 Conversely, Strickland and Black maintained that
their conversation pertained only to Strickland’s inquiry into

44. See, e.g., ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAWS § 12:132 (2012), available at Westlaw SECDRSL (contending that use of “should
know” in the Dirks opinion was hardly a “slip of the pen”).
45. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S 642, 675 (1997) (holding that
insider trading liability was supported by the misappropriation theory when a lawyer
representing a company during a merger traded on the information); Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 311 n.21 (1985) (affirming a
decision permitting tippees to sue for misrepresentations). Circuit courts have since
parroted the Dirks Court’s use of “should know” when addressing questions of tippee
liability. See, e.g., WPP Lux. Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 1039,
1056 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2713 (2012); SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632
(7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1992). But see, e.g., SEC
v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (failing to employ the Dirks Court’s
“should know” standard); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (same).
46. See JACOBS, supra note 44, § 12:119 (asserting that the anomalies between
Dirks and Hochfelder “continue to plague” us today); Thomas O. Gorman, Case Study:
SEC v. Obus, LAW 360 (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://www.law360.com/white
collar/articles/378428/case-study-sec-v-obus (suggesting that the significance of the
Obus decision was its resolution of the crucial issue related to tippee scienter).
47. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2012).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 280. This information was obtained by Strickland via public sources. Id.
50. Id.
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Black’s opinion of SunSource’s management, which Strickland
sought as part of his due diligence analysis.51
Soon after, Black contacted his boss at Wynnefield Capital, Nelson
Obus.52 The SEC and Black disagreed about the details of Black’s
conversation with Obus. Black maintained that he contacted his boss
to relay his suspicion, based on Strickland’s questions, that
SunSource was contemplating a transition that would dilute its
existing shares.53 The SEC asserted that Black disclosed Allied’s
pending acquisition of SunSource, which was not yet public
information.54 Following his conversation with Black, Obus called
SunSource’s CEO, Maurice Andrien.55 Andrien claimed that in the
course of their conversation he learned that Obus had been tipped
about the acquisition, a fact that Obus denied.56
On June 8, 2001, about two weeks after Black and Strickland’s
initial conversation, Wynnefield Capital purchased 287,200 shares of
SunSource at $4.75 per share.57 The transaction was initiated by a
trader at an outside trading company who contacted Wynnefield
Capital with the offer.58 Wynnefield Capital’s June 8th purchase was
approximately the same size as the company’s earlier purchases of
SunSource stock.59 On June 19, 2001, Allied publicly announced that
it was acquiring SunSource.60 As a result, SunSource’s share price
nearly doubled in value, earning Wynnefield Capital a paper profit of
about $1.3 million.61
Subsequently, the SEC filed a complaint against Obus, Black, and
Strickland for alleged violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.62
Under the misappropriation theory,63 the SEC asserted that as an
employee of GE, Strickland had a duty to the corporation to keep
confidential the information regarding the SunSource acquisition,
and that he breached that duty when he disclosed the information to
51. Id.
52. Id. at 280–81.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 281.
55. Id.
56. Id. Andrien testified that Obus had told him “a little birdie told me that you
guys are planning to sell the company to a financial buyer,” and implied, then
confirmed, that the “little birdie” was someone at GE. Id.
57. Id. at 282.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 283.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26 (explaining that the
misappropriation theory allows for liability upon breach of a fiduciary duty owed to
the source of material nonpublic information).
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Black.64 The SEC sought to hold Black and Obus liable as tippees—
after-the-fact participants in Strickland’s breach.65
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining
that the SEC had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Strickland breached his duty to GE.66 The court
based its decision on the fact that GE’s internal investigation of
Strickland’s conduct found that Strickland had not breached his duty
to the corporation.67 Finding that Strickland—the alleged tipper—
had not breached his duty, the court concluded that Black and Obus
could not be held liable as tippees.68 The SEC appealed the district
court’s order, and the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo.69
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision
The Second Circuit began its discussion with an overview of the
misappropriation theory and the status tipping holds as a basis for
insider trading liability.70 In its discussion, the court noted the role
that scienter plays as a requisite for liability, stating, “[i]n every
insider trading case, at the moment of tipping or trading, . . . the
unlawful actor must know or be reckless in not knowing that the
conduct was deceptive.”71 Turning its attention specifically to the
tippee’s scienter, the court espoused the rule established by the Dirks
Court and highlighted the nature of its conflict with the Hochfelder
opinion.72 The Second Circuit asserted that both standards were
relevant to the question of tippee liability and that their conflict with
each other is cured by distinguishing the facts or conditions to which
the different standards pertain. Specifically, the court offered the
following:

64. SEC v. Obus, No. 06 CIV 3150 GBD, 2010 WL 3703846, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2010), vacated, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). The SEC also asserted liability under
the classical theory, id. at *10–13; however, this Note limits its discussion to
misappropriation because the SEC appealed to the Second Circuit solely on that
theory.
65. Id. at *1.
66. Id. at *16.
67. Id. at *15–16.
68. Id.
69. Obus, 693 F.3d at 284.
70. Id. at 284–85.
71. Id. at 286.
72. Id. at 286–88; see supra Part I.B (explaining the apparent conflict between the
Dirks decision, which implies that tippee liability can be established through a
negligence standard, and the Hochfelder decision, which rejected negligence as
sufficient for liability).
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[T]he best way to reconcile Dirks and Hochfelder in a tipping
situation is to recognize that the two cases were not discussing the
same knowledge requirement . . . . Dirks’ knows or should know
standard pertains to a tippee’s knowledge that the tipper breached
a duty . . . to his principal . . . .
Hochfelder’s requirement . . .
pertains to the tippee’s eventual use of the tip through trading or
further dissemination of the information.73

The court explained that this framework applies to each tippee in a
“tipping chain.”74 As such, each tippee must know or have reason to
know that the information was procured through a breach, and each
tippee must intentionally or recklessly trade on the information or
further tip the information for personal benefit.75
Applying this framework, the court concluded that contrary to the
district court’s ruling, the SEC had offered sufficient evidence to
withstand summary judgment.76 The Second Circuit first determined
that the SEC had provided sufficient evidence to establish a factual
question as to whether Strickland breached his fiduciary duty to GE
by tipping Black on the acquisition.77
The Second Circuit
determined that the findings by the GE internal investigation were
not determinative, concluding that there was otherwise sufficient
evidence that Strickland knew he owed GE a duty to keep the
acquisition information confidential and not to use it for his personal
profit.78
The court next turned to whether Black inherited the duty to
disclose or abstain as a derivative of Strickland’s breach.79 The circuit
court performed a fact-specific analysis to determine if Black knew or
should have known that Strickland breached his fiduciary duty to GE
when he conveyed the confidential information to Black.80 The
Second Circuit found that Black was a sophisticated financial analyst,

73. Obus, 693 F.3d at 288.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 293. Summary judgment is appropriate only where “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Considering this
high bar, which a defendant moving for summary judgment must overcome, the
Second Circuit’s decision is not untenable in light of evidence presented by the SEC.
See supra notes 47–65 and accompanying text (offering the facts alleged by the SEC
and the defendants as understood by the Second Circuit).
77. Id. at 291.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 292.
80. Id. at 288, 292.
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Black personally knew Strickland and that Strickland worked for GE
in the development of financing packages, and Black knew that
information related to a pending acquisition would be both
confidential and material to trading.81 These facts, the court
concluded, would allow a jury to find that Black knew or had reason
to know that Strickland’s tip constituted a breach of his fiduciary
duty.82
Lastly, the Second Circuit evaluated whether Obus—the final
tippee in the chain—also inherited the duty to disclose or abstain.83
The court admitted that unlike the situation with Black, there was no
evidence to indicate that Obus was aware of Strickland’s precise
position at GE.84 Yet, this fact was not fatal, as the court found that
Obus’s financial sophistication gave him reason to know that
Strickland breached his fiduciary duty, a conclusion further
supported by Obus’s call to Andrien.85 The Second Circuit surmised
that from the facts taken together, a jury could determine that Obus
knew or had reason to know that Strickland had a duty to keep the
acquisition information confidential.86
The Second Circuit
completed its analysis of Obus’s liability by finding that the SEC
provided sufficient evidence for a jury to also determine that Obus
traded while he knowingly possessed material nonpublic
information.87
III. APPLYING TWO DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF AWARENESS RESULTS IN
A LOGICAL INCONGRUITY AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH INSIDER
TRADING’S CONNECTION TO FRAUD
The Second Circuit appears to have taken a Solomon-like
approach in resolving the conflict between the Dirks and Hochfelder
decisions, splitting the elements of tippee liability and assigning a
distinctive knowledge standard to each. The Dirks negligence-like
standard emerges in the court’s discussion of the tippee’s knowledge
that the tipper breached his or her fiduciary duty in communicating
the information.88 The Hochfelder actual (or reckless) knowledge
standard emerges in the court’s discussion of what the tippee does

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 292.
Id.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 288.
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with that information.89 At first blush, the Second Circuit’s approach
seems to be a workable, if not obvious, resolution of the DirksHochfelder conflict, as it preserves—at least superficially—the edicts of
both opinions.90 However, the court’s resolution requires that these
two elements of tippee liability can be severed and analyzed
independently under differing standards of awareness,91 a condition
that this Note argues is both impractical and contrary to insider
trading liability’s foundation in fraud.
In what is otherwise described as a murky body of law,92 there is
little doubt that liability for insider trading under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 requires both the existence of a duty to disclose or abstain
derived from a fiduciary relationship and the improper use of
material nonpublic information as a basis for trading.93 In effect, the
Second Circuit resolved the Dirks-Hochfelder conflict by distinguishing
the state of mind required to create the tippee’s duty to disclose or
abstain from the state of mind required to create liability for the
tippee’s failure to disclose or abstain in light of this duty.94 The
problem with such a distinction is that the tippee’s knowledge of the
tipper’s breach cannot be strictly isolated to its function of giving rise
to the tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain. Understanding the flaw in
the Second Circuit’s dual-awareness approach requires a critical look
at how these two requirements interact to create tippee liability. For
a tippee to be liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the tippee
must not just knowingly trade on information; he or she must
knowingly trade on improper information.95
The information’s
89. Id.
90. Compare id. at 288 (“[T]ippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or
had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and
transmitted improperly . . . , and if the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while
in knowing possession of that information.” (emphasis added)), with Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of
a corporation . . . only when . . . the tippee knows or should know that there has been
a breach.” (emphasis added)), and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976) (concluding that liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will not lie in
the absence of “knowing or intentional misconduct”).
91. See Obus, 693 F.3d at 288 (“[T]he best way to reconcile Dirks and Hochfelder in
a tipping situation is to recognize that the two cases were not discussing the same
knowledge requirement . . . .”).
92. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of the
Den of Thieves: A Conceptual Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O’Hagan, 33
TULSA L.J. 163, 163 (1997).
93. Stuart Sinai, Rumors, Possession v. Use, Fiduciary Duty and Other Current Insider
Trading Considerations, 55 BUS. LAW. 743, 757 (2000); Swanson, supra note 13, at 201–02.
94. See Obus, 693 F.3d at 288; see also supra Part I.A (describing the theories under
which the duty to disclose or abstain arises and under what circumstances this duty
creates liability for insider trading).
95. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659–60 (rejecting the assertion that anyone who
possesses material nonpublic information is prohibited from trading on that
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impropriety stems not from the fact that it is material and
confidential;96 it stems from the conditions under which the
information was gained.97 In the case of a tippee, the improper
nature of the information results from the tipper’s breach.98
Therefore, the tippee’s knowledge of the tipper’s breach can be said
to “necessitate[] tippee knowledge of each element.”99
However, the Second Circuit maintains that the Hochfelder Court’s
knowing or reckless standard applies only to the tippee’s use of
material nonpublic information100 and not to the tippee’s knowledge
of the information source. Thus, there is a degree of incongruity in
the Second Circuit’s approach, as it would seem that a tippee, who
only negligently knew of the tipper’s breach, could not then
knowingly trade on the basis of improper information if the
information is only made improper by the breach.101 In other words,
the negligence standard annuls the actual or reckless knowledge
standard in that a tippee may knowingly or recklessly trade on
information without knowing that the information is of the type of
which the Act and accompanying Rule prohibit trading. Such an
effect would be contrary to insider trading regulation’s foundation in
common law fraud and to its purpose of protecting the stability of the
securities market.
information and extending liability only when one “assume[s] an insider’s duty to
the shareholders not because they receive inside information, but rather because it
has been made available to them improperly”).
96. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (rejecting the theory that
there is a “general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information”).
97. Id. at 230; see also SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(stating that for a tippee to have acted with scienter, the tippee must be in “knowing
possession of material information obtained in violation of a duty of trust and
confidence”); Anderson, supra note 20, at 360–61 (concluding that the Court’s
discussion of tippee liability in Chiarella “suggests that the wrong associated with the
tippee’s behavior is not deception of the other party to the trade[,] . . . [r]ather, the
wrong is the use of confidential information improperly acquired”).
98. Swanson, supra note 13, at 201–02; see also Obus, 693 F.3d at 288 (“[T]ippee
liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential
information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly (and thus through
deception)” (emphasis added)); LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 1003
(postulating that the theory of tippee liability is “simply a manifestation of the
broader principle that the transactions of those who knowingly participate with the
fiduciary in [his or her] breach are as forbidden as transactions [completed] on
behalf of the trustee himself.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at
659) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99. State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
100. Obus, 693 F.3d at 286.
101. Cf. Buell, supra note 13, at 532 (“[I]f a court holds that fraud requires an
intent to defraud and that an intent to defraud, in turn, requires scienter as to the
falsity of the representation, then the second fault standard has displaced the first.”
(footnote omitted)); JACOBS, supra note 44, § 12:119 (explaining the anomalies that
exist when one tries to apply both the Hochfelder and Dirks standards).
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The decisions in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan can be read to create
a general scheme of insider trading liability: Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 prohibit fraudulent deception; deception occurs where there is
a knowing and unlawful failure to disclose or abstain from trading on
material nonpublic information; the failure to disclose or abstain is
unlawful only where there is a duty to disclose or abstain; the duty to
disclose or abstain arises only where there exists a fiduciary
relationship
between
insider/misappropriator
and
the
shareholders/information
source.102
Hochfelder’s
scienter
requirement flows from this basis, as “deception necessarily
implicates state of mind.”103
Tippee liability for insider trading does not fit seamlessly into this
arrangement because a typical tippee does not meet the last
requirement—a direct fiduciary relationship.104 The Dirks Court
explained that absent this direct fiduciary relationship, a tippee’s
duty is derivative of that of the possessor of the fiduciary relationship,
arising only when the fiduciary has breached the relationship and the
tippee is aware of that breach.105 The Court elucidated that “the
tippee’s obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a
participant after the fact in the insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty.”106
The Court’s designation of the tippee as a “participant” in the insider
or misappropriator’s breach implies that the tippee must engage in
active conduct constituting more than just passive negligence.107
Therefore, while the Second Circuit was technically consistent with
the specific “knows or should know” language used by the Dirks Court
when it provided the basis for the tippee’s duty, its approach may be
inconsistent with the Dirks Court’s rationale for creating such a duty.
This proposition is further supported by the Court’s resolve that
insider trading regulation is not founded on the notion that all
participants in the securities market are entitled to equal access to

102. See supra notes 15–26, 43 and accompanying text.
103. Swanson, supra note 13, at 155.
104. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 (discussing that the duty to refrain from trading
arises from the trader’s relationship to the shareholders).
105. Id. at 659.
106. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
n.12 (1980)).
107. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding that a tippee “cannot be said to be a knowing participant in the tipper’s
breach” unless the tippee “knew” that the tipper breached his or her duty) (quoting
State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)); State
Teachers Ret. Bd., 592 F. Supp. at 594 (“It is not, then, the knowledge of possession of
material, nonpublic information that creates tippee liability; rather, it is the
knowledge of joint participation, with the tipper, in the tipper’s breach of duty.”).
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information.108 Setting aside moral objections, the prevailing belief is
that an oscillating distribution of information actually increases
market efficiency.109 The view is that “[i]f participants believe it is
worthwhile to seek out valuable market information, investing
considerable time and effort to ‘beat the market’ with better
research, those efforts enhance market efficiency.”110 The Second
Circuit’s decision is contrary to this theory because it puts at risk the
innocent tippee who receives and uses market information without
actually or recklessly knowing that his or her acquisition of the
information was improper.
CONCLUSION
Following the Second Circuit’s Obus decision, courts are still left
wanting for a resolution to the Dirks-Hochfelder conflict because the
court failed to provide a workable resolution congruent with insider
trading liability’s long-time marriage to fraud. Therefore, the
question of what level of awareness is required of a tippee to be liable
for insider trading remains on the long list of insider trading-related
questions awaiting the Supreme Court’s answer.

108. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33; Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. at 595.
109. Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV.179, 182 (1991); Swanson, supra note 13, at 160.
110. Id.

